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COMMENTS

Protecting the Innocent: Confrontation,
Coy v. Iowa, and Televised Testimony
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
INTRODUCTION

The sexual abuse of children produces a wider range of emotions than most problems facing our society today.' In recent years,
2
the American public has become acutely aware of this problem,
and its disturbing proportions.3 Naturally, state legislatures have
been called upon to respond to this crisis. 4 The result is a bewildering array of statutes designed to facilitate the successful prosecution of child sexual abusers. 5 This Comment focuses on judicial
treatment of these statutes.
Initially, this Comment addresses the problems encountered in
6
prosecuting such cases and the legislative response thereto. Part I
also introduces the tension between such legislative efforts and the
constitutional rights of the accused. 7 Next, this Comment examines

, See generally Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions:
Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HA~v. L. REv. 806 (1985); Armstrong & Gilig, Responding
to Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: The Kentucky Approach, 16 N. Ky. L. REv. 17
(1988).
2 See Note, supra note 1, at 806 ("The McMartin Preschool scandal and others that
followed have quickened public sensitivity to the issue .... ") (citations omitted).
I See J. SEKiN & P. ScHoUTEN, THE CHILD SExuAL AUSE CASE mi mE CouRTRooM:
A SoURcE BOOK 1 (1987) ("The number of reported cases of child sexual abuse has increased
seventeen-fold over the past decade."); see also D. Wmrco~m, E. SsPnto, & L. SELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CIID: IssUES FOR JUDGEs AND PROSECUTORS 1-4 (1985)
(citing several studies conducted on the incidence of child sexual abuse).
4 See D. W~arcom, E. SnApmo, & L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 3, at iii. Perhaps
the earliest request for legislative, as well as judicial intervention was Liba, The Protection
of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REv.
977 (1969).
See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.

[VOL. 78

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Coy v. Iowa,8

which deals with a state statute similar to those at issue here. 9 Part
III provides an analysis of several state court opinions that attempt
to reconcile Coy with their own statutes. 0 This is the primary focus
of the Comment, revealing the copious problems states face in this
area. Finally, this Comment addresses the constitutionality of such
statutes," and offers some useful and constitutionally viable alternatives designed to alleviate many of the problems of prosecuting

child sexual abuse cases. 12
I.

PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS, AND

MORE

PROBLEMS

Child sexual abuse cases are undoubtedly among the most4

difficult to prosecute successfully.13 In addition to other problems,

the prosecutor is frequently forced to rely heavily on the testimony
of the child, as there are rarely any other witnesses to the abuse. 15
Thus, often the entire case rests on the testimony of the alleged
victim.' 6 Many researchers and commentators have suggested that
the trauma associated with testifying in open court in the presence
of the defendant, judge, and jury is nearly as great as that associated with the abuse itself. 7 Indeed, many cases never go to trial

for fear of such trauma.

8

- 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). See infra notes 32-70 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 21-22 for an extensive list of the statutes.
1oSee infra notes 71-114 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
12See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
13 See Whitcomb, Child Victims in Court: The Limits of Innovation, 70 JUDICATURE
90, 90-91 (1986).
14 Other problems
include the child's competency to testify, the child's memory,
possible susceptibility to suggestion, and the sensitive nature of the testimony to be provided.
See generally Melton, Sexually Abused Children and the Legal System: Some Policy Recommendations, 13 Am. J. FAm. TanRAPY 61 (1985).
1 See Forman, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 437, 437 (1989).
16See Note, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the Courtroom: New Utah Rules and
Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. CONTEmp. L. 81, 82 (1989).
1' See J. MYERS & N. PERRY, CHLD WrnEss LAW AND PRAcTICE 383-87 (1987) (citing
what has been referred to as the "second victimization" of the child); see also D. W1rTcoMB,
E. SHAPIRo, & L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 3, at 17-20.
" See Comment, Sixth Amendment-Defendant's Right to Confront Witnesses: Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 79 J. CuIM. L. &
CRIMNOLooy 759, 783 (1988) ("[A]n attorney, who had reviewed between seventy-five and
eighty cases of child abuse ... testified that nearly ninety percent of the child abuse cases
were dismissed because children could not cope with the prospect of facing the defendant,
relatives and strangers in a courtroom." (citing State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (footnotes omitted)).
"
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Recognizing the legal system's predicament, state legislatures
began passing legislation designed to facilitate successful prosecution of these cases. 19 A second, and paramount, goal of this legislation was to lessen the trauma of in-court testimony on the
unfortunate victims of such abuse. 20 Children, it was assumed,
were ill-prepared for the psychological pressures often encountered
on the witness stand.
The resulting statutes allow the child to testify via closed-circuit
television21 or by means of a videotaped deposition.2 Typically,
the child is taken to a room outside the courtroom, together with
the judge, attorneys, and possibly the defendant.23 The defendant,

19Apparently, the first such statute of this kind was drafted by the Texas state
legislature. See TEx. CUM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon 1989). Portions of the
original statute were found unconstitutional in Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 323 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987). The statute was then amended. See generally Note, The Revision of
Article 38.071 After Long v. State: The Troubles of a Child Shield Law in Texas, 40
BAYLOR L. REv. 267 (1988) (discussing the Texas child shield law and its amendments
following a Texas court decision declaring the former law unconstitutional).
10 "In enacting the challenged statute, the Iowa legislature stated its purpose: to
'assure the fair and compassionate treatment of victims' and to 'protect them from intimidation and further injury, [and to] assist them in overcoming emotional and economic
hardships resulting from criminal acts .... '" Brief for Appellee, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012 (1988), at 13 (citing 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1178).
21 See ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); AIASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1989);
Aiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp.
1989); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West
Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1989); HAw. R. Evm. 616 (1985); ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 106A-2 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Bums
Supp. 1989); IowA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434
(1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:283 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CTS. & Jut). PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1989);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (Law Co-op. Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. Am. § 595.02(4)
(1988); MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West
Supp. 1989); N.Y. CRan. PROC. LAw § 65.00 - .30 (McKinney Supp. 1990); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN.tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1990);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp.
1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1989); TEx. CODE Cans. PROC. ANN. § 38.071
(Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1989); VT. R. Evm. 807 (1989);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (1988).
2 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CoLO. R~v. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); DEL.
CODE ANN.tit. 11, § 3511 (1985); MicH. Comn,. LAws ANN. § 600.2163a (West Supp. 1988);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.680, 492.304 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15401 to 403 (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1926 (1989); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 174.227
(Michie 1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-917 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law Co-op. 1984); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-12-9 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (West Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-408
(1987).
21 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) ("[T]he
testimony of the child [shall] be taken in a room other than the courtroom .... Only the
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if allowed to be present, is blocked from the view of the child
while the testimony is given2 If the defendant is not allowed to
be present, 25 he or she is kept in another room where the child's

testimony can be viewed on a television screen. 26 Depending on the
procedure used, the testimony is either preserved on tape for later

introduction at trial or simultaneously broadcast to the jury. 27
These statutes, designed to ease the pain of testifying in the

presence of the accused, potentially conflict with the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation.n The conflict implicates the

explicit, literal right to confront witnesses at the time of trial,
which the Supreme Court has noted "forms the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause."

29

As the purpose behind

confrontation is the advancement of the "truthfinding function"30
of a criminal trial, this conflict is of paramount importance to the
defendant. Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed
this conflict. 1 The result, far from satisfactory, has only muddied
the waters.
II.

THE Coy DECISION

In August 1985, John Avery Coy was arrested and charged
with sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls.3 2 At trial, the
attorneys for the defendant and for the state, persons necessary to operate the equipment,
and any person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child
may be present in the room with the child during his testimony.").
2 See, e.g., ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(A) (Supp. 1988) ("The court shall
permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the minor in person but shall
ensure that the minor cannot hear or see the defendant.").
2 For the present analysis, whether or not the defendant is present at this stage is
largely inconsequential. However, see infra notes 106-09 for a discussion of what constitutes
"presence."
2 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.9(D) (1988) ("The child's testimony shall be
transmitted by closed-circuit television into the courtroom for the defendant, jury, judge
and public to view.").
" Compare ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988). (closed-circuit testimony) with ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987) (videotaped deposition later admitted in evidence at trial).
" U.S. CoNST. amend. VI states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ." In Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment is
binding upon the states under the fourteenth amendment.
" California v. Green, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1934-35 (1970). A complete sixth amendment
analysis of the issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, such an analysis is
undertaken in Comment, ."Face - to Television Screen - to Face": Testimony by ClosedCircuit Television in Cases of Alleged Child Abuse and the Confrontation Right, 76 Ky.
L.J. 273 (1987-88).
"' Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (1986).
31

Coy, 487 U.S. 1012.

12Id. at 1014.
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state made a motion, pursuant to a recently enacted statute, 33 to
allow the girls to testify behind a screen or using closed-circuit
television. 34 The trial court authorized use of the statutory procedure that allowed a large screen to be placed between the defendant
and the girls during their testimony. 35 The girls could not see Coy
and he could see them only "dimly. "36 After unsuccessfully at37
tacking the constitutionality of the procedure in the state courts,
Coy sought review in the United States Supreme Court.
By a 6-2 decision, 38 the Court reversed Coy's conviction, finding
a clear violation of his confrontation right. 39 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, traced the history of the "literal" right to confront witnesses 4° and concluded that "there is something deep in
human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prose-

cution.'

",41

Justice Scalia reiterated that the rights conferred by the confrontation clause are not absolute, 42 but noted that exceptions had
43
been made previously only to those rights implicit in the clause.
This, however, is not the same as "identify[ing] exceptions, in light
of other important interests, to the irreducible literal meaning of
the clause." 44 The Court refused to consider whether any such
exceptions exist. 45 Since the Iowa statute imposed a generalized

31IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1989) (enacted in 1985).
3 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014.
3s Id.
36 Id.

31The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed Coy's conviction. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d
730, 735 (Iowa 1986).
11 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan, White,

Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in
which Justice White joined. Justice Blackmun dissented and was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Kennedy, although appointed by this time, did not participate in the

decision.
3' Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020 ("It is difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging
violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter.").
0 Id. at 1015-20. Justice Scalia quoted from the Bible, the writings of Shakespeare,

and the speeches of President Eisenhower.
4' Id. at
42 Id. at
4 Id. at
examination);

1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
1020.
1020-21 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (crossOhio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1980) (excluding out-of-court state-

ments); and Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (1987) (asserting confrontation right at
some point in proceedings other than trial).
" Id. at 1021.
45 Id.
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presumption of trauma on all child witnesses in sex abuse cases,
and was only recently enacted, 46 the Court could not sustain it as
an exception "firmly ... rooted in our jurisprudence." 47 The
Court concluded by remanding the case to the Iowa Supreme Court
4
to determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the decision, 49 clearly defined
her position on the constitutionality of statutes calling for televised
testimony.5 0 She noted that many such statutes raise no confrontation claim, since the testimony is taken in the presence of the
accused.5' According to Justice O'Connor, even the literal right to
face-to-face confrontation is not absolute 2 and may give way to
an "important public policy" 53 if a court makes a "case-specific
finding of necessity . . . .- 4 The protection of child witnesses is,
to her, "just such a policy." ' 55 Thus, if there is an individualized
finding of potential trauma to a child witness in a prosecution for
sexual abuse, the "strictures of the confrontation clause may give

way

....

",56

She concluded with a prediction that in future cases

"[t]he primary focus ... likely will be on the necessity prong,"
that is, whether the procedure used is necessary to further an
important state interest.57 This suggestion has become the well5
worn peg upon which state courts have hung their hats. 1
Justice Blackmun, dissenting 5 9 found no sixth amendment violation,6° and rejected the majority's interpretation of the "con-

"6See IowA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (1989) (enacted in 1985).

4
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021 (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2783
(1987) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 91 S.Ct. 210 (1970))). Even here, though, Justice Scalia
noted that this standard applies only to exceptions to the implicit guarantees of the clause.
48 Id.
19Justice O'Connor was joined by Justice White.
0 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1IId. at 1023 (citing ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55
(Supp. 1989); N.Y. ClMi. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1990); CAL. PENAL
CODE ANN, § 1347 (West Supp. 1989)).
" Id. at 1022.
13

54

Id. at 1025.
Id.

35 Id.
56

Id.

57

Id.

See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324, 1327-28 (Colo. App. 1988); Craig v.
State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1124-29 (Md. 1989), cert. granted, -U.S.
-, 110 S.Ct. 834
(1990); State v. Davidson, 764 S.W.2d 731, 733-34 (Mo. App. 1989). The Craigcase squarely
presents to the Court the issue addressed in this Comment.
11Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
60Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 1034 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"
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stellation of rights provided by the confrontation clause." ' 61 He
concluded, quite simply, that "the ability of a witness to see the
defendant while the witness is testifying does not constitute an
essential part of the protections afforded by the Confrontation
Clause." ' 62 Adhering strictly to the view that the clause embodies
only a "preference for face-to-face confrontation,' '63 the dissent
posited that the confrontation clause "difficulties" presented by
this case were "no more severe than others this Court has examined." The dissent also agreed with Justice O'Connor's assertion
that the important public policy of protecting child witnesses outweighs the "narrow" right asserted by the defendant, 6 but parted
company with her on the adequacy of a generalized presumption
of trauma." According to the dissenters, such presumptions are
"commonplace" and no stricter requirements should be placed on
the states in these cases 67
Finally, Justice Blackmun addressed Coy's due process claim,
concluding that the screen was not inherently prejudicial. 6 s Despite
the fact the courtroom lights were dimmed and a panel of bright
lights were focused on the screen, Justice Blackmun nonetheless
concluded "[ilt [was] unlikely that the use of the screen had a
subconscious effect on the jury's attitude toward appellant." 69
Additionally, the dissent believed it important that the trial court
gave the jury a "helpful" instruction, which insured that no "im70
proper inference" would be drawn from the use of the screen.

III.

TBE

AFTERMATH OF Coy

Relying on Coy v. Iowa, several state courts have upheld the
constitutionality of their child witness statutes. 71 Others, also rely-

61Id. at 1028.
61 Id. at 1030.
63 Id.

at 1031.

&Id.
6

Id. at 1032.

6 Id.
6Id.

at 1033.

Id. at 1034. The majority declined to address this issue. Id. at 1021.
6Id. at 1035 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70 Id.
11See, e.g., State v. Bonello, 554 A.2d 277 (Conn. 1989); Glendening v. State, 536
, 109 S. Ct. 3219 (1989); State v.
So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, .... __U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 212
Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Iowa 1989), cert. denied, ...... U.S.
(1989).
6
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ing on Coy, have declared their statutes unconstitutional. 72 This is

not particularly surprising given Coy's unique facts 73 and its divergent rationales. 74 Though state court treatment of Coy is not sur-

prising, it is quite disturbing.
The story of Robert James Tafoya is, unfortunately, illustrative.7 5 Tafoya was convicted of several sexual offenses perpetrated
against six young girls and one adult woman. 76 At trial, the State

invoked a statute 77 and court rules78 that allowed the victims to
testify via videotape. 79 The statute required that the deposition be
taken "in the presence of . .. the defendant." 80 The trial court,
apparently interpreting this phrase to require only that the defendant see the child, placed the defendant in a "control booth" so

that the victims could not see him. 8' He could see the witnesses
and was able to communicate with his attorney.82 Prior to Coy,
the Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed the conviction,
finding no violation of the procedure mandated by the statute83

and no confrontation clause violation. 84 Shortly thereafter, New
85
Mexico's highest court denied certiorari.

Tafoya then sought review in the United States Supreme Court.

6

The Court granted the writ of certiorari,vacating and remanding
the case for further consideration in light of Coy. 8 7 On remand,

the state court again affirmed Tafoya's conviction.88 The court

See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 542 So. 2d 1373, 1376 (La. 1989); cf. Commonwealth
v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1988) (decided while Coy was pending, holding state
statute unconstitutional as a violation of the state confrontation clause; court's reasoning
strikingly similar to that employed in Coy.).
11The Iowa statute at issue in Coy was the only one in existence authorizing that
particular screening method. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1023 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
74See supra notes 32-70 and accompanying text.
" See State v. Tafoya, 729 P.2d 1371 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) [hereinafter Tafoya 1].
16 Id. at 1372-73.
77 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984).
71N.M. DIST. CT. R. 5-504; N.M. CRim. P.R. 29.1.
79 Tafoya 1,729 P.2d at 1373.
0 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17(A) (1984).
Tafoya I, 729 P.2d at 1373.
'mId.

83Id.
4 Id. at 1375.
11Tafoya v. State, 728 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1986).
" Tafoya v. New Mexico, .. U.S.
-, 108 S. Ct. 2890 (1988).
8Id.

" State v. Tafoya, 765 P.2d 1183, 1187 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied,

U.S.

-,

109 S. Ct. 1572 (1989) [hereinafter Tafoya 11].
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reasoned that since there was ample evidence establishing the trauma
the children would face if required to testify in open court and in
the physical presence of the defendant, the case was easily distinguishable from Coy.8 9 This same rationale was offered by the court
in its first opinion affirming the conviction. 9° The court, while
paying lip service to Justice Scalia's opinion, was apparently comfortable relying heavily on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
9
in Coy. 1
The Tafoya case is illustrative of the standard now followed in
many states regarding the constitutionality of child witness statutes
in the wake of Coy.92 Armed with a scalpel and the hands of a
skilled surgeon, state courts today are carving out their own interpretations of Coy. Gleaning support from O'Connor's concurring
opinion, several states have "camouflaged by case law and nibbled
by necessity"9' one of the most fundamental and essential rights
guaranteed to those accused of a crime.
A.

Analysis of State Court Opinions

The state court opinions upholding the constitutionality of child
witness statutes consistently focus on the necessity issue, i.e., the
demonstration of some sort of trauma to the child if forced to
testify in front of the defendant. 94 However, inconsistencies run
rampant on the issues of the degree of potential trauma necessary 95

'9

Id. at 1185-86.

Tafoya I, 729 P.2d at 1374-75.
Tafoya II, 765 P.2d at 1186 ("Although the majority opinion in Coy does not
expressly state that a strong showing of necessity could, in another case, overcome a
defendant's confrontation rights, 'nothing in the Court's opinion conflicts with this
approach.'" (quoting Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
91See, e.g., State v. Jarzbek, 554 A.2d 1094 (Conn. 1989); In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d
342 (Iowa 1989); State v. Crandall, 555 A.2d 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
91United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 1979).
w See, e.g., State v. Eaton, 769 P.2d 1157 (Kan. 1989). The defendant's conviction
was reversed because the trial court erroneously held that the Kansas statute did not require
a finding that the child witness would be "so traumatize[d] ... as to prevent the child
from reasonably communicating or would render the child unavailable to testify." Id. at
1167-68. The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute by implying a need requirement
for future cases. Id. at 1164.
Compare People v. Rivera, 535 N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (sufficient for
court to make findings of necessity by its own conclusions and observations) with State v.
Eastham, 530 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1988) (per curiam) (trial court findings were not sufficiently
particularized to support a finding of necessity).
"

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VoI,. 78

and the method of proof required. 96 One state focuses not on the

injury the child may suffer, but on the reliability of the child's
testimony if forced to face the accused. 97 Inconsistencies aside,
these approaches all share the same grave problems, stemming in
large part from the unwarranted assumptions underlying their rationales.
First, these decisions are uniformly based on the assumption

that child witnesses, especially in cases involving sexual abuse, are
inherently different from adult witnesses. 98 Though many commentators agree, 99 scientific evidence on this point is inconclusive. 10

Indeed, some researchers conclude there is little difference between
the testimonial capacities of children and those of adults. 01 1
Second, research on the potential trauma suffered by a child

victim as a result of testifying against the accused is equally inconclusive. 102 Some studies have shown that, while certainly not true
in all cases, physically confronting the accused in court can be
therapeutic for the child. 103 Clearly, any child sexual abuse victim
called upon to testify will be somewhat traumatized. The same can

be said of the adult rape victim, the murder witness, or any number
of other witnesses. While perhaps unfortunate, this is an established
component of the truth-finding process of a criminal trial.

Compare State v. Chisholm, 755 P.2d 547 (Kan. 1988), vacated, -U.S.
109 S. Ct. 486 (1988) (no expert testimony offered to prove necessity of invoking statute)
with State v. Crandall, 555 A.2d 35, 39-40 (N.J. 1989) (in the absence of reasons to the
contrary a child witness should be evaluated by a psychiatrist to determine potential trauma
if the defendant so requests).
Bonello, 554 A.2d at 280; see also Eaton, 769 P.2d at 1167-68 (focusing on child
witness' ability to communicate).
" See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984):
An adult witness, testifying in court, surrounded by jhe usual court atmosphere, aware of a black-robed judge, a jury, attorneys, members of the public,
uniformed attendants, a flag, and religious overtones, is more likely to testify
truthfully. The opposite is true of a child, particularly when the setting involves
a relative accused by her of sexual abuse.
Id. at 1332. But cf. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d at 374 ("For constitutional purposes, no
principled distinction can be drawn between a child witness and any other class whom the
Legislature might in the future deem in need of special treatment.") (footnote omitted).
9"See D. WrrcOm, E. SiAnio, & L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 3, at 13-20.
100See Melton, supra note 14, at 62, 66.
I Id. at 62 (citing studies).
102 Id. at 66; see also Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d at 369 n.4 (citing Graham, Indicia of
Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MAMi L. REv. 19, 87 (1985)).

"I3See Melton, supra note 14, at 65 (citing studies); see also Bulkey, Introduction,
Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MiAm L. REv. 5, 10 (1985).
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Third, and perhaps most disturbing, is the assumption of truth

accorded the child's testimony.

The belief that a child will not

be able to testify in front of the accused because of fear, trauma,

or unreliability assumes that the child's version of the events is
true. Specifically, judges and prosecutors now accept as true a

child's allegation of sexual abuse, since (so the assumption goes)
any change in the testimony would make it untrue. This reasoning
is not only illogical, it is unconstitutional. The jury, not the judge,
is to assess credibility and accept or reject witnesses' testimony.
The more logical approach, and the one that is constitutionally
mandated, is to assume nothing concerning the child witness' testimony. The truthfulness of the victim's testimony should be eval-

uated by the same processes used to examine other testimony,
which includes subjecting the witness to confrontation with the
accused. Confrontation, after all, is designed to ensure, not defer,
truthful testimony. 10 5
Yet another problem with the use of these statutes is their
application in individual cases. Again, relying on the concurring
opinion in Coy,1°6 some courts have upheld their statutes on the
ground that the defendant is present during the taking of the child's
testimony.1° This approach ignores one simple fact: if the defendant is present, the statute serves no purpose whatsoever. Perhaps
this explains the strained interpretation of "presence" offered by
cases like Tafoya.1 0 8 Such judicial gloss serves only to aggravate

the problem.'0 9
In the final analysis, implementation of these procedures denies
the jury information critical to its decision. If the child's testimony

114 This assumption is particularly disturbing where, as here, guilt may be proven solely
by the testimony of the alleged victim. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
310 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
106 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Initially, many such procedures
may raise no substantial Confrontation Clause problems since they involve testimony in the
presence of the defendant.").
1*7 See, e.g., Rivera, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (Court upholds statute "because it permits
the witness to see the defendant and vice versa, albeit, through a closed circuit television.");
cf. People v. Tuck, 537 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (although New York's
statute was not involved, court held that child witness could testify from a table located
near the jury as long as the defendant was present).
10, See supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
"19 If "presence" does not require the child to see (or at least be able to see) the
defendant, it is obviously logical to conclude that the sixth amendment has not been violated,
since the defendant was "present." This analysis misinterprets the Constitution because it
reduces confrontation to a meaningless procedure, which is satisfied if the defendant is
isolated behind a screen or in a "control booth."
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is preserved on videotape and presented as evidence at trial, the
jury is denied the opportunity to assess the demeanor of the child
in the physical presence of the accused. Similarly, they are unable
to view the accused's response to the testimony at the time it is
given. 10° Even when simultaneous closed-circuit testimony is broadcast to the jury from another room, the advantages of physically
assessing demeanor are reduced to a "face-to television screento face" encounter."'
Although the child witness statutes are laudable in purpose,
they are an unconstitutional infringement on the defendant's right
to confrontation. The defendant, not the witness, is guaranteed
this protection. Though the states have legitimate interests in effective law enforcement and in the protection of children victimized
by sexual abuse," 2 such interests cannot justify a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights. After all, "[flt is a truism that
constitutional protections have costs. '""s Physical confrontation
comes at such a cost because "face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the
same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal
4
the child coached by a malevolent adult.""1
IV.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Despite concerns to the contrary, "' declaring child witness statutes unconstitutional would not unduly inhibit legislative innova-

tions in the area of child sexual abuse cases. Several other
alternatives are available to ameliorate any trauma suffered by the
child while preserving the rights of the accused.
First, sex abuse cases can be given priority on court dockets to
116
reduce the amount of time the child spends in the judicial system.
This benefits not only the child, but all other parties as well, since
the child presumably will have a clearer memory of the incident.
Second, many commentators have advocated a joint investigative
110
See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
M Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 234 (Ky. 1986) (Stephens, C.J., dissenting).

112Coy,

487 U.S. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

M3Id. at 2802.
114Id.

M"Id. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
D. Wwnrco~m, E. SHAPimo, & L. STELLWAOEN, supra note 3, at 105-06 (making
recommendations and citing statutes).
116See
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effort in following up reports of sexual abuse.' 1 7 This would decrease the amount of time and trauma associated with repeatedly
conveying the details of the abuse to all the individuals involved
in the pre-trial investigation."'
Once a case proceeds to trial, other options are available to
accommodate the needs of the child witness. For example, the
appointment of a "court guardian" to assist in and explain the
proceedings to the child can be quite beneficial. 119 Not only would
this put the child at ease, but it also would impress upon him or
her the seriousness of the proceeding, thus strengthening the truthfinding function of the trial. If necessary, court-supervised counselling should be made available to the child. 20 This should not be
limited to remedial counselling, but should include preventive counselling to monitor any potential problems the child may experience.
Finally, the court atmosphere should be as informal and comfortable as possible. This will minimize the natural intimidation experienced by most child witnesses.' 2 1 For example, minor changes in
the physical layout of the courtroom may put the child more at
ease. 122

One final note is in order. Despite replete commentary and
case law in this area, there is a disturbing paucity of comment on
the most important part of the problem-the prevention of child
sexual abuse. This crime is one that feeds upon itself, as more
than eighty-percent of child sexual abusers were themselves victims
of abuse as children.'2 Education, information, and financial resources must be made available to combat the further spread of
child sexual abuse. Thus, in order to treat the disease, and not the
symptoms, legislatures should first enact legislation aimed at prevention.124 With this in mind, the twin goals of protecting the child
victim and insuring the integrity of the criminal justice system can
be achieved.

"I See

id. at 99-104.
its See id.

119See id. at 89-97.
t2 See Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d at 378.
121

Id.

' See, e.g., Tuck, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (child inaudible from witness stand, so court

allowed chair to be moved in front of jury with back to defendant). Radical changes in the
courtroom are neither necessary nor proper. Cf. Libai, supra note 4, at 1016-18.
121

Armstrong & Gillig, supra note 1, at 20 (citing

KENTUCKY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

AND EXPLOITATION PREVENTION BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1986)).
,"A See id. at 20-25 for Kentucky's response in the area of prevention.
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CONCLUSION

Statutes aimed at easing the burden of testifying on the victims
of child sexual abuse miss the mark. Sacrificing the rights of the
accused for the comfort of the victim is an unprecedented step in
the wrong direction. Though the ends are legitmate, the means
chosen to those ends are fatally flawed. Allowing child victims to
testify via videotaped deposition or by means of closed-circuit
television unconstitutionally infringes upon the defendant's right
to confrontation.
Protecting victims of child sexual abuse is a weighty interest
worth pursuing. Protecting the defendant, however, is constitutionally mandated. Both of these obligations can be fulfilled by the
state without harm to one another. Once this is realized, the states
can and should fashion appropriate legislation designed to achieve
those ends. Only then will the means survive.
Randal C. Shaffer

